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Abstract

The charitable deduction has enjoyed relatively little support in the legal
academy. Many commentators have asked what it adds to the tax system and, as critics
have observed, the deduction obviously does not itself collect tax revenue. Defenders
respond that the deduction helps measure income and keeps taxpayers from inefficiently
substituting leisure for work, but these points are, of course, contested. Instead of
revisiting debates about what the deduction adds to the tax system, this Article focuses
on the broader question of what it adds to the pursuit of public goals. The deduction –
and any other government subsidy that matches charitable contributions through the tax
system (here called “subsidized charity”) – enlists private individuals to pursue public
goals in a somewhat unique manner. While in other settings the government delegates
implementation but still specifies the goal to be pursued, charitable donors are allowed
to select the goal as well. Is it desirable to pursue public goals in this way?
This Article analyzes three reasons to subsidize charitable contributions, each
responding to a different information or incentive problem that is inherent in the pursuit
of public goals. First, the subsidy can counter free-riding by encouraging donors to be
more generous. A second objective is to measure and respond to popular preferences
about public goals. Subsidized charity can encourage experimentation and competition
and can empower minority perspectives that are underrepresented in the political
process. Yet subsidized charity also disproportionately represents the views of wealthy
donors. The third goal, which is new to the academic literature, is to recruit private
donors to monitor the quality of nonprofits, so that the government can piggyback on
these quality-control efforts.
Since there are three competing rationales for the subsidy, its institutional design
can vary depending upon which has priority – an insight that is new to the literature. To
encourage generosity, the subsidy should focus on wealthy donors, giving them broad
discretion about which causes to support and targeting marginal contributions.
Recruiting these wealthy donors as monitors is largely compatible with this program. Yet
by focusing on wealthy donors, the subsidy may fail to reflect broad popular preferences.
In response, one option is to compensate with other policy instruments, such as
government programs, to address the preferences of low-income nondonors. While I find
this approach appealing, others could reasonably want subsidized charity itself to be
more representative. Toward that end, we can go to extra lengths to persuade low
income taxpayers to contribute more (e.g., through extra-generous matches) or, for that
matter, to induce wealthy donors to contribute less (e.g., through caps on giving) or to
support causes that reflect broad popular consensus (e.g., through limits on which causes
are subsidized). Yet the cost of making the subsidy more representative in this way is that
it will be less effective at advancing our other goals of encouraging generosity and
recruiting monitors.
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V. Conclusion

The charitable deduction has enjoyed relatively little support in the legal
academy. Many commentators have asked what it adds to the tax system and, as critics
such as Stanley Surrey and Paul McDaniel have observed, the deduction obviously does
not itself collect tax revenue.1 Defenders respond that the deduction helps measure
income and keeps taxpayers from inefficiently substituting leisure for work, but these
points are, of course, contested.2 Instead of revisiting debates about what the deduction
adds to the tax system, this Article focuses on the broader question of what it adds to the
pursuit of public goals. The deduction – and any other government subsidy that matches
charitable contributions through the tax system (here called “subsidized charity”) –
enlists private individuals to pursue public goals in a somewhat unique manner. While in
other settings the government delegates implementation but still specifies the goal to be
pursued,3 charitable donors are allowed to select the goal as well.4 Is it desirable to
pursue public goals in this way?5

1

Stanley Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 205, 287-89 (1985); Paul R. McDaniel, Federal
Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax, 27 Tax L. Rev. 377
(1972).
2
Professor Andrews argues that money the taxpayer gives away, and thus does not consume, should not be
considered her income. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions and the Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L.
Rev. 309 (1972). In response, Professor Kelman argues that giving money away is something a taxpayer
chooses to do, so this money should be considered her income. Mark Kelman, Personal Deductions
Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal
World, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 831 (1979). See also Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or
Matching Grants? 28 Tax L. Rev. 37 (1972) (noting that charitable deduction is needed to create parity in
tax treatment of those who donate money and those who donate time); Peter Diamond, Optimal Tax
Treatment of Private Contributions for Public Goods With and Without Warm Glow Preferences, 90 J. Pub.
Econ. 897 (2006) (arguing that charitable deduction allows marginal rates to be higher by keeping
taxpayers from substituting leisure for work).
3
Examples include government contracting (e.g., to build a new weapons system), regulation (e.g., to
reduce pollutants), or targeted tax benefits (e.g., to promote education).
4

Donors can choose from a very broad range of public goals: “The exempt purposes set forth in section
501(c)(3) are charitable, religious, educational, scientific, literary, testing for public safety, fostering
national or international amateur sports competition, and the preventing cruelty to children or animals. The
term charitable is used in its generally accepted legal sense and includes relief of the poor, the distressed,
or the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education or science; erecting or
maintaining public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening the burdens of government; lessening
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This Article analyzes three reasons to do so, each responding to a different
information or incentive problem that is inherent in the pursuit of public goals. First, the
subsidy can counter free-riding by encouraging donors to be more generous. This goal is
familiar,6 but novel applications are explored here. A second objective is to measure and
respond to popular preferences about public goals. Subsidized charity can encourage
experimentation and competition and can empower minority perspectives that are
underrepresented in the political process. Yet subsidized charity also disproportionately
represents the views of wealthy donors. While this Article draws on prior work in
delineating these competing considerations, 7 the analysis here offers new insights and
institutional design responses. The third goal is to recruit private donors to monitor the
quality of nonprofits, so that the government can piggyback on these quality-control
efforts. This goal is new to the literature, as are the institutional design alternatives
offered to enhance it.

neighborhood tensions; eliminating prejudice and discrimination; defending human and civil rights secured
by law; and combating community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.”
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,id=96099,00.html.
5

The literature focuses on public goods such as clean air, which are undersupplied because they can be
enjoyed even by those who do not pay for them. But this Article uses the broader phrase “public goals”
because other market failures require government intervention as well – to redistribute wealth, operate
natural monopolies, and address imbalances in information, among others.
6
See Mark Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 U. Va. L. Rev. 1393 (1988)
(justifying charitable deduction in part as response to free riding); Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform:
Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 687 (1999). There is also a burgeoning economics
literature on why individuals give to charity, and whether a charitable subsidy will increase or decrease
private giving. See generally James Andreoni, Philanthropy, unpublished manuscript prepared for the
Handbook of Giving, Reciprocity, and Altruism (surveying literature); Gerald F. Auten, Charles T.
Clotfelter & Richard L. Schmalbeck, Taxes and Philanthropy Among the Wealthy, in Does Atlas Shrug?
(Joel B. Slemrod, ed.) (2000).
7
See Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 387 (1998) (defending charitable deduction as a
way to circumvent public choice problems that arise when the government allocates funding); Burton
Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of a Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three Sector Economy in The Economics
of Nonprofit Institutions (Susan Rose Ackerman, ed.) (1986) (defending charitable deduction as
empowering minorities to pursue public goals that majoritarian political processes would not endorse).
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Since there are three competing rationales for the subsidy, its institutional design
can vary depending upon which has priority – a tension that, to my knowledge, is new to
the literature. To encourage generosity, the subsidy should focus on wealthy donors,
giving them broad discretion about which causes to support and targeting marginal
contributions. Recruiting these wealthy donors as monitors is largely compatible with
this program. Yet by focusing on wealthy donors, the subsidy may fail to reflect broad
popular preferences. In response, one option is to compensate with other policy
instruments, such as government programs, to address the preferences of low-income
nondonors. While I find this approach appealing, others could reasonably want
subsidized charity itself to be more representative. Toward that end, we can go to extra
lengths to persuade low income taxpayers to contribute more (e.g., through extragenerous matches) or, for that matter, to induce wealthy donors to contribute less (e.g.,
through caps on giving) or to support causes that reflect broad popular consensus (e.g.,
through limits on which causes are subsidized). Yet the cost of making the subsidy more
representative in this way is that it will be less effective at advancing our other goals of
encouraging generosity and recruiting monitors.
Part I offers a justification for subsidizing charity, rooted in problems of
information and incentives. Part II considers the goal of encouraging generosity, and
institutional design alternatives for doing so. Part III explores the goal of representing
preferences, as well as associated tradeoffs and institutional design alternatives. Part IV
analyzes the goal of recruiting private monitors, as well as the tradeoffs and institutional
design options it involves. Part V is the conclusion.8
8

Given the breadth of this topic, a number of issues are not considered. There is no discussion of in-kind
giving or split-interest giving, and only passing reference (mostly in footnotes) to the gift and estate taxes,

3

I: The Externalities of Giving and the Challenges of Information and
Incentives
It is well understood that contributions to charity generate positive externalities
that justify a commitment of public resources. Yet it does not necessarily follow that
subsidized charity is the best means to deliver these public resources, instead of
alternatives such as tax-supported government programs. If a cause is worthwhile, why
shouldn’t the government simply pursue it directly? Why use subsidized charity? This
Part previews three reasons, each of which addresses problems of information and
incentives that burden competing policy alternatives.
A. Externalities of Charitable Giving
Gifts of all sorts – not just charitable gifts – generate positive externalities.9 For
instance, if a grandmother gives her grandson $1000, the grandson will enjoy spending
this money, and the grandmother derives separate satisfaction from this gift. Feelings of
altruism induce the grandmother to be happy whenever her grandson is happy. This is
true whether or not the grandmother is the cause of this happiness; indeed, if her
grandson finds the cash in the street, an altruistic grandmother still feels joy in her
grandson’s good fortune. In addition, the grandmother may feel additional satisfaction
from knowing that she is the one who made this gift, a sensation separate from altruism
that economists call “warm glow.”10

special issues associated with foundations, the tax exemption of nonprofits, and the question of what
qualifies as a public goal (and thus the boundary between nonprofits and for-profit firms).
9

See Louis Kaplow, Tax Policy and Gifts, 88 Amer. Econ. Rev. 283 (1998); Louis Kaplow, A Note on
Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J. Pub. Econ. 469 (1995 (discussing double utility associated with gifts).
10
Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Finance (2007).
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In deciding whether to make a gift, the grandmother undercounts the utility it
generates. The problem, as Louis Kaplow has shown, is that she doesn’t fully account for
her grandson’s utility.11 His happiness should be double-counted since it makes two
people happy (both the grandmother and grandson), but instead his happiness is counted
only once (just through the grandmother’s feelings about his happiness). Thus, gifts
generate positive externalities, since the donor does not fully account for the donee’s
utility when making a gift.
A charitable gift is like any other gift in this respect, as Louis Kaplow has
emphasized.12 In addition, charitable gifts present other welfare benefits. First, they are
likely to support public goods, so this means that the cause being funded is broadly
valued. Not only the donor and the donee derive utility, but also free riders who are
pleased to know that a cause they value is being supported, even if they don’t support it
themselves. Second, charitable gifts often involve redistribution, which enhances welfare
since donees tend to be less wealthy than donors and thus have greater need for the
money. Third, donors derive satisfaction in contributing labor, as well as money, and
sometimes find community and recognition through the nonprofits they support.13
On the other side of the ledger, charitable giving can lead to welfare losses as
well. Donor motivations are complex and in some cases the satisfaction from giving is
limited. Peter Diamond and Jim Andreoni offer the example of someone who gives to an
aggressive panhandler in order to end the unpleasantness of the solicitation.14 Yet I

11

Id.
Id.
13
For example, religious institutions continue to be hubs of communal life for many people. Especially
among wealthy people, boards and social activities of museums, educational institutions, and hospitals
offer a social network and a sense of community.
14
Diamond, supra note 2; Andreoni, supra note 6.
12

5

suspect this motivation is unusual in other settings, if only because there are painless
ways to refuse a solicitation. It is perfectly easy to explain that one has other
commitments, leaving no capacity for another gift even to a worthy cause. Indeed,
sometimes people derive perverse satisfaction from refusing a solicitation, using the
opportunity to articulate reservations about the cause.15 Even so, Diamond and
Andreoni’s critique reminds us of the need to consider context.16
Donees and free riders may experience welfare losses as well. Although
receiving a gift generally makes donees better off, they may feel some resentment, and
may also become less motivated to work.17 Again context is important, though, since
some gifts may actually enhance the donee’s ability to work, such as charitable support
for education or health care. The reactions of free riders can also prove complex. While
they may be pleased that a cause they value is attracting support, as noted above, they
may also envy the recognition the donor receives for the gift.18
The net of these various effects determines which social investments give rise to
the greatest positive externalities, and thus justify a commitment of the most resources.
As a normative baseline, welfarists generally want each public goal to be supported to the
extent that it is valued, in the aggregate, by individual members of society. This “Lindahl
solution,” as it is called, simulates what the market would supply in the absence of

15

It may be more difficult to say “no” to friends, but if there is an implicit qui pro quo – we give to a
friend’s charity, and in return they give to our’s – then we are really making an indirect contribution to our
own preferred cause.
16
Diamond and Andreoni go farther, suggesting almost as a matter of principle that it is never appropriate
to factor a donor’s “warm glow” in the social welfare function. But this goes too far. Obviously, many
donors derive great joy from their donation, and this satisfaction should not be dismissed as irrelevant.
17
Kaplow, supra note 10.
18
Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka, On the Desirability of Taxing Charitable Contributions (unpublished
manuscript) (2006).
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market failure.19 Although this Article generally uses the Lindahl result as the baseline,
other baselines obviously are plausible as well, such as a Rawlsian approach that favors
the preferences of the least well off.
B. Why Rely on Subsidized Charity Instead of on Alternatives?
The Lindahl solution (and any other baseline) can be pursued through various
institutional arrangements, including government regulation, government programs
(whether at the federal, state, or local level), government grants to for-profit firms and
nonprofits, targeted tax credits for specific public goals, and the like. Why, then, should
we rely on subsidized charity?
To answer this question, we should determine which approach is more efficient
and more equitable. Which is less likely to be resisted by potential funders, so that they
will not change their behavior in inefficient ways? Which generates lower administrative
costs? Which allocates money more reliably to high-value public goals? Another
important set of questions asks which approach is more consistent with our distributional
goals and our notions of democratic legitimacy.
To make these judgments, we need to look for notable differences between
subsidized charity and its alternatives. Yet as an initial matter, it is worth emphasizing
that, at least in theory, the differences may be quite limited. In a hypothetical world of
perfect information and incentives, at least, government programs and nonprofits should
yield the same results (as, indeed, would the market). After all, the decision of how much
of the economy to devote to public goals is made by the same people – whether
individually as donors or consumers or collectively as taxpayers – and, in a world of
perfect information and incentives, the decision ought to be the same in either setting.
19

For a discussion of the Lindahl solution or benefit pricing, see Gergen, supra note 6, at 1400-01.
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Likewise, these same people decide which goals to support, and in this idealized
environment the institutional context should not affect this choice. Either their
government representative will accurately assess collective sentiment and will faithfully
translate it into the relevant programs, or individuals will band together on their own to
pursue the same goals. Finally, the implementation of these public goals should be of
equal quality – whether conducted by government or private employees – because, by
assumption, each workforce is perfectly informed and motivated.
The goal of this thought experiment is not to prove that it is irrelevant whether we
use subsidized charity or an alternative. On the contrary, in the spirit of Coase and
Modigliani and Miller,20 the goal is to show why this institutional design choice really
does matter by showing how unrealistic our premises have to be in order for it not to
matter. If we need to make heroic assumptions about information and incentives in order
to render institutional design unimportant, then we know that information and incentives
have to be a central preoccupation in determining whether to rely on subsidized charity.
C. Information, Incentives and the Case for Subsidized Charity
Indeed, information and incentives lie at the heart of three challenges that arise in
pursuing public goals, whether through subsidized charity or in other ways: securing
funding; allocating this funding among competing public priorities; and monitoring
quality. A subsidy for charitable contributions has unique advantages in addressing these

20

See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960) (arguing that legal
rules would not matter in a world with no transaction costs because parties would bargain around the rules);
F. Modigliani and MH Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48
Amer. Econ. Rev. 261 (1958) (arguing that capital structure would not matter in a world of perfect
information and no transactions costs).
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challenges. Yet there are disadvantages too, as well as tensions among the three goals,
such that institutional design is important in managing tradeoffs.
1. Encouraging Generosity
The first goal is to raise money. The familiar problem here – in both tax
collection and charitable fundraising – is that potential funders sometimes free ride,
withholding support even from programs they favor and hoping others will pick up the
slack. Free riders depend on imperfect information, since their true ability to pay (in the
case of taxes) and their true level of generosity (in the case of charity) can be concealed,
at least in part. In response, a familiar rationale for subsidizing charitable contributions is
to persuade donors to be more generous.
2. Reflecting Preferences
A second challenge that arises in pursuing public goals, whether through
subsidized charity or in other ways, is that there is imperfect information about which
causes should be supported.21 We don’t know enough about popular preferences or about
which emerging approaches or technologies are the most promising means to fulfill these
preferences. Those who claim to have this information, moreover, may be motivated to
misstate the facts. Does someone who is touting a new approach to educating teenagers
really believe that she will succeed, or is she merely seeking a donor- or governmentsupported sinecure?
An important institutional design goal, then, is to funnel the subsidy toward high
value projects. In response, subsidized charity can serve as a means for identifying and
reflecting popular preferences, since the government invests money only when individual
21

There is a familiar parallel problem with gifts among family and friends. Donees sometimes value gifts
at less than their cost. See Joel Waldfogel, The Deadweight Loss of Christmas, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 1328
(1993).

9

donors do so as well. In a sense, donors are voting with their dollars. Whether individual
donors are making this decision (as in subsidized charity) or government processes are
doing so (as is the case with most policy alternatives), flaws in the process will lead to an
overinvestment in some public goals and an underinvestment in others (as measured
against the social welfare function that is our baseline). “Allocation error” is used here to
describe the welfare cost of these misallocations. As an example, assume that an
eccentric donor uses a nonprofit to build a museum on the history of ketchup – or, for that
matter, an eccentric member of Congress secures an earmark to build one in his district.
Allocating public money to this low priority project, instead of a high priority such as
feeding hungry children, creates a welfare cost. Minimizing this sort of allocation error
is an important goal in designing a subsidy for charitable contributions.
3. Monitoring Quality
Third, imagine that a soup kitchen opens too late in the morning – missing the
opportunity to serve breakfast – because its manager likes to sleep late. Unlike the
ketchup museum, the problem here is not with the goal, but with the way it is pursued.
As in any other setting, agents are tempted to shirk or to behave self-interestedly, and
principals may not have enough information to know they are doing so. “Implementation
error” is used here to describe the welfare costs from poor or costly administration.
Minimizing this sort of error is a third objective in designing a subsidy for charitable
contributions.
To what extent can a subsidy for charitable contributions deliver on these goals,
and at what cost? We turn now to a discussion of each of these goals, the tradeoffs they
present, and institutional design options for mitigating these tradeoffs.

10

II. Encouraging Generosity
The fact that charity is voluntary gives rise to a tradeoff: donors enjoy giving to
charity more than they enjoy paying taxes (because charity is not compulsory) but,
unfortunately, they don’t give enough (again, because charity not compulsory). A
familiar reason to subsidize charitable contributions is to address this incentive problem
by encouraging donors to be more generous.

A. The Tradeoff in Relying on Volunteers for Funding
1. Donor Satisfaction from Giving
A great advantage of relying on charitable contributions is that they are given
voluntarily, and thus avoid some of the welfare costs of (compulsory) taxation. In
generating utility for both the donor and the donee – so-called “double” utility –
charitable contributions avoid the familiar problem of “excess burden” from taxation,
which arises when taxpayers make wasteful changes in their behavior to avoid paying
taxes. Indeed, the ability to deduct charitable deductions may actually reduce the excess
burden from taxation, as Peter Diamond has claimed, by inducing taxpayers to work
harder without having to pay taxes on the extra income they earn (i.e., as long as they
give it to charity).22
Creating this double utility is not a frictionless process, as donors must find
charities that they enjoy supporting. Solving this information problem is the role of
professional fundraisers, who help pair donors with programs they would enjoy funding
that are also high priorities for nonprofits. In effect, fundraisers are “double utility”
22

See Diamond, supra note 2.
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engineers.23 Obviously, there are administrative costs associated with this effort, both for
nonprofits (e.g., the time of managers and fundraisers as well as the cost of events,
mailings, and the like) and for potential donors (e.g., time and effort reviewing
solicitations). Containing these costs is desirable, and it is worth knowing how they
compare with the administrative costs of a tax increase.
There may also be a qualitative difference, beyond any quantitative one, between
tax collection and charitable fundraising. The latter can have collateral educational and
community building benefits. For example, when a zoo or museum hosts a benefit or
sends a brochure informing the public about its activities, it is providing entertainment
and information that is likely to be appealing to many people. Would anyone say the
same of Form 1040 or a tax audit?24
2. Free Riding and the Need for a Subsidy
Nevertheless, charity has the disadvantage of raising only a limited amount. As
noted above, even those who value a public goal may look to others to pay for it when the
benefits of a goal are widely shared.25 A familiar response to free-riding is a government
subsidy, which forces nondonors to give their support through taxes they pay. If some
would-be-donors are discouraged from giving because they don’t want others to free ride
on their generosity, then a subsidy reassures these donors about giving. This is especially
23

Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 Yale L. J.
239 (1984) (lawyers as “transaction cost” engineers).
24
Perhaps the best analogy to a nonprofit’s fundraising costs are the advertising expenses incurred in the
for-profit sector, which might be either informative or wasteful depending upon the context. See William
S. Vickrey, One Economist’s View of Philanthropy, in Philanthropy and Public Policy 31, 55 (Frank G.
Dickinson, ed. 1962) (“The pursuit of the contributor’s dollar has obvious external economies and
diseconomies not greatly dissimilar to those encountered in any kind of selling activity.”). Meanwhile,
even a Form 1040 can have some value aside from its role in tax collection, for instance, as financial
disclosure to a taxpayer’s creditor. I am indebted to Brian Galle for this point.
25
The charitable sector cannot command enough resources to fund all of our society’s public goals; it
represents only six percent of our economy compared with over 30% for the government. See Auten,
Clotfelter & Schmalbeck, supra note 6, at 392.
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true if the subsidy is structured as a match so that, in giving their own money, donors can
direct tax revenue to their preferred cause as well.26
Of course, it would be counterproductive if donors have the opposite reaction,
responding to a subsidy by reducing their giving. Since others are giving, they may feel
that they are off the hook.27 This reaction is likely for donations motivated by altruism
(such that the donor wants the cause to be supported, but doesn’t care if she is the one
supporting it), but not for donations motivated by warm glow (such that the donor cares
that she herself is the source). The precise effect obviously is an empirical question, and
the vast literature on the subject shows that tax subsidies do increase the level of
contributions, but less than once was thought. 28 There is clearly room for improvement
on this dimension.
While we want to increase the volume of charitable contributions – something a
properly structured subsidy can do – we obviously also want to preserve the double utility
benefit too. When contributions are subsidized, do donors still feel enthusiasm for
contributing? The double utility benefit is not as robust for marginal contributions, since
26

In the public finance literature, solutions to free riding problems tend to link the giving of each donor to
the giving of the others. For example, Professors Bagnoli and Lipman posit that the free-riding problem is
solved if everyone’s gift is conditioned on the fact that everyone else must give; if even one person does
not give, then everyone else receives a refund. Mark Bagnoli & Barton L. Lipman, Provision of Public
Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions, 56 Rev. Econ. Stud. 583 (1989). In
the same spirit, Sandler and Posnett theorize that donors are more likely to give if they believe that, in
giving, they are likely to prompt others to give. Todd Sandler & John Posnett, The Private Provision of
Public Goods: A Perspective on Neutrality, 19 Pub. Fin. Q. 22 (1991).
27
Using this logic, Professor Warr has proposed a “neutrality theorem,” positing that subsidies to charity
will not affect the level of giving, since government support will perfectly crowd out private donations.
P.G. Warr, The Private Provision of a Public Good is Independent of the Distribution of Income,
Economics Letters 207 (1983). This influential article spawned a host of theoretical papers developing and
critiquing this result. For example, one problem with Warr’s theory, pointed out in a widely cited piece by
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, is that a subsidy can still increase giving on a net basis by tapping
nondonors. See T.C. Bergstrom, L.E. Blume & H.R. Varian, On the Private Provision of Public Goods,
29 J. Pub. Econ. 25 (1986)
28
Early studies showing a larger effect failed to filter out effects on timing and thus tended to overstate the
impact on overall giving. Auten, Clotfelter & Schmalbeck, supra note 6 (implied income elasticities of .41
and 43).
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these are gifts that donors otherwise would not have made. Yet donors still derive some
utility from these gifts or they would not make them (i.e., as long as the subsidy is less
than 100%). The donor may also derive utility from being able to direct government
money to her preferred cause as well.29
B. Institutional Design: Constraints on Donor Choice
How should the subsidy be structured if its goal is to encourage generosity. Three
issues are considered in this Section and the next two: First, how free should donors be
to choose the cause they want to support? What constraints, if any, should there be on
this choice? Second, how should the subsidy be distributed among donors with different
incomes? Should it focus especially on wealthy donors? Third, how should the subsidy
be structured? How much should be given per dollar of charitable contribution? Should
this level be constant across all contributions, or should it change as giving increases?
The best way to encourage generosity is to give donors the broadest possible
latitude about which causes to support. People are more likely to support causes that
move them, so if our goal is to increase the overall level of support (without regard to
what is being supported), we ought to let donors choose.
There is, however, one important constraint: We need to be sure the contribution
is genuinely charitable, and is not a disguised purchase of goods or services (which
obviously would not generate the same positive externalities). This is not a new insight,
and current law already polices this line through the private benefit doctrine, as well as
29

The extent to which this is the case, if at all, obviously depends on the donor’s utility function. Louis
Kaplow suggests that warm glow donors would not derive any utility from the government’s share of their
contribution, since the whole idea of warm glow is that the donor values the fact that the contribution
comes from her. See Kaplow, supra note 10. Yet one can imagine donors who are happy to be “the
source” of the contribution in the sense that it happened because of their choice, even though it didn’t come
from their pocket. An analogy here is the pleasure that a trustee of a foundation takes in allocating funds to
a cause, even if the trustee is not the donor of the foundation’s assets. To my mind, this feeling of agency
should also be considered warm glow.
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the requirement that charities disclose the value of goods or services provided to donors,
and the like. This concern also helps explain why gifts to private individuals are not
subsidized, even though they can also generate positive externalities, as noted above. It
probably is too difficult to police whether a payment to a private individual is a gift or
part of an exchange.
C. Institutional Design: Distribution
A further institutional design choice is whether to focus subsidy dollars on a
particular subset of the population, or to spread them evenly. If the goal is to encourage
generosity most effectively – or, to be more precise, to maximize the overall level of
contributions induced by a given subsidy expenditure – then the focus should be on highincome donors.30 Empirically, their charitable giving is the most tax sensitive, and this is
not surprising. It should cost less to induce a high-income donor to give a dollar in
charity than a low income donor, since the opportunity cost in welfare terms is higher for
a low income donor, given the diminishing marginal utility of consumption. For
instance, it might require a subsidy of 50 cents to persuade the high-income donor,
compared with a subsidy of a full dollar for the low income donor.31 Dollars
concentrated at the upper end, then, will induce more contributions.32

30

In this spirit, the charitable deductions in the estate and gift taxes are relevant only to very wealthy
people – since only they are subject to these taxes (assuming the incidence of the tax is on decedents as
opposed to heirs). While a discussion of whether we ought to have these taxes is beyond this Article’s
scope, it is worth noting that an advantage of current law is that the focus of the deduction in the estate and
gift taxes is on very wealthy people, and that this may be a relatively effective way to encourage
generosity. It is worth noting, moreover, that donor utility from making bequests may vary with the reason
for the bequest. So-called “precautionary savers” who saved more than they needed and leave these assets
to a charity may derive relatively little utility from these inadvertent bequests.
31
Jeff Strnad, The Charitable Deduction: A Politico-Economic Analysis, in The Economics of Nonprofit
Institutions (Susan Rose Ackerman, ed.) 276 (1986) (noting that absolute value of price elasticity increases
with income).
32
There is an irony, then, in the fact that a deduction is currently used in our income tax, instead of a credit.
With a deduction, the subsidy per dollar obviously increases with income (in allowing the taxpayer to avoid
a higher marginal tax). It doesn’t make sense to offer a more generous subsidy per dollar to wealthy
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As a matter of distributional justice, an appealing aspect of encouraging charity
from the wealthy is that it induces them to increase their support of public goals. Since
charity tends to be redistributive, we are promoting voluntary redistribution, while also
placing public burdens on those best able to bear them. Even so, it is difficult to analyze
the distributional impact of the charitable subsidy in isolation. Obviously, the rate
schedule has a pronounced distributional effect, and it can be set in combination with the
charitable subsidy, however structured, to achieve the overall objective we are seeking.
For instance, one possible critique of focusing the charitable subsidy on the wealthy is
that they will disproportionately enjoy the consumption component of subsidized charity
– that is, the pleasure of making subsidized gifts. But this does not raise any
distributional issue if they “pay for” this consumption benefit through the rate structure.
Toward this end, the charitable subsidy can be financed through an increase in the top
bracket, as Jeff Strnad has shown.33
A different distributional concern, though, is that subsidized charity can give
wealthy donors disproportionate influence in deciding which public goals are pursued
with tax dollars. As we shall see in Part III, there are ways to diminish this influence, but
at the cost of encouraging generosity less effectively.
D. Institutional Design: Structure
We turn now to the “structure” of the subsidy, a term used here to refer to the
trigger for the government contribution, and how this trigger changes in different
circumstances.
people, since they could probably be persuaded to give with a lower subsidy per dollar, on average. Even
so, the subsidy can still be structured as a deduction if the amount per dollar is appropriate for high-income
taxpayers. If that is the case, then chances are it is too low for low income taxpayers, such that the subsidy
focuses on the wealthy, for the reasons noted above.
33
See Strnad, supra note 31, at 265.

16

1. Matching
If the goal is to encourage generosity, the subsidy should be structured as a match,
so that it is triggered by private contributions. In other words, the government should
invest in a nonprofit only if private donors are also doing so. This is an obvious virtue of
the charitable deduction under current law.
Yet there is a significant tax benefit for charity, wholly separate from the tax
deduction, that does not have a matching component: the exemption of nonprofits from
federal and state income tax.34 A nonprofit can enjoy these benefits without collecting a
single dollar from a donor. These benefits do not reward charities for fundraising, but for
running a surplus. To see the point, consider two charities, A and B. A has a $10 million
budget, which comes entirely from private donations, and A spends every dollar it raises
on its programs. Since A has no profit, it does not benefit from being tax exempt, even
though it is heavily engaged in fundraising. In contrast, B does no fundraising at all. It
raises $10 million per year from the fees it charges customers, but it does not spend this
entire amount on its programs. Since B runs at a profit, it benefits from being tax
exempt; yet this government support obviously is not targeted toward bringing in more
donations since, in this extreme example, there are no private donations. Unlike the
deduction for charitable contributions, then, the tax exemption for nonprofits is not
tailored to encourage additional private contributions. If our goal is to encourage

34

Exemption from property taxes is not, strictly speaking, a matching program, but it is closer since
someone must put up the money to buy the property. Yet if the charity finances the property by running an
operating surplus, there is no matching element, and a property tax exemption becomes no different from
an income tax exemption.
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generosity, we would be better off scaling back the tax exemption and redirecting these
resources to increase the generosity of the tax deduction.35
2. Marginal Contributions
In designing the subsidy, we are more likely to maximize contributions by
concentrating our resources on “near misses” – that is, on marginal contributions the
donor is tempted to make, but will not make without a subsidy. To see the point,
consider a donor who is deciding whether to make gifts of $100,000 to any of four
different charities – A, B, C, and D. Let’s say the donor derives $120,000 worth of
satisfaction from a $100,000 gift to A; $90,001 of satisfaction from a $100,000 gift to B;
$80,001 from such a gift to C; and $70,001 from such a gift to D. Without a subsidy, the
donor will make a gift only to A, so that total private contributions are $100,000.
Assume, then, that the government introduces a $30,000 subsidy. To maximize
contributions, the subsidy should go to the near misses, B and C: $10,000 for B (so the
donor has to give only $90,000) and $20,000 for C (so the donor has to give only
$80,000). This way, total private contributions rise to $270,000. In contrast, dedicating
$30,000 to D leads to a smaller increase in private giving – to only $170,000 – since A
and D are supported, but B and C are not. Finally, using the $30,000 subsidy on A is
counterproductive – since the donor will make this contribution anyway – and causes
private contributions to decline to $70,000.36

35

Of course, there may be other justifications for a tax exemption – for example, as a way to subsidize
endowments, so they can substitute for the equity capital that a nonprofit cannot attract. Yet there
obviously are alternative means of pursuing this goal, such as tax-exempt borrowing by nonprofits. In any
event, a comprehensive evaluation of the tax exemption is beyond this Article’s scope.
36
The analysis above focuses on maximizing contributions and not on maximizing donor utility, which is
more complicated and, in any event, is only part of the picture (since we also care about the utility of
beneficiaries, and thus about the level of giving, allocation and implementation error, etc.). To an extent,
donor utility is also enhanced by focusing on near misses, since donors would rather have these funded than
their lower philanthropic priorities. Thus, donor utility is enhanced more by a subsidy for B and C – the
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The problem, though, is unobservable heterogeneity. Some people are more
generous than others, so the level of contributions that is marginal is hardly uniform. If
we had perfect information, we would know what each individual would do without a
subsidy, and we would customize the subsidy for each individual, so that it focuses on
marginal contributions. But we don’t know how generous people really are and if we
start the subsidy at a lower contribution level for less generous taxpayers, then everyone
has incentive to understate their generosity so they can collect a larger subsidy.
Obviously, the information costs here are quite substantial, raising the question whether
we should even try to account for heterogeneity in institutional design. Do we want a
standardized schedule that applies to everyone, or one that is tailored to individuals?
Options for a standardized schedule are considered first, since they are easier to
administer, and then a tailored approach is discussed as well.
3. Slope of Subsidy: Declining, Constant, or Increasing?
Whatever we do, an important guideline is that any individual donor is likely to
find the first dollar she contributes to charity to be easier than the last, since there is
diminishing marginal utility in her own consumption. To choose an extreme case, it
obviously is easier for someone who earns $100,000 to increase charitable giving from
zero to one dollar (and thus to forgo the last dollar of consumption) than to increase her
near misses – than by a subsidy for D. To see the point, let’s use the example above, and let’s assume that
the donor has $400,000 that she can either give to charity or keep for personal consumption. If B and C are
subsidized, the donor’s utility is $420,002 ($120,000 from the gift to A, $90,001 from the gift to B, $80,001
from C, and $130,000 of utility from the money she keeps). In contrast, if the subsidy is devoted to D,
then her utility is only $420,001 ($120,000 from A, $70,001 from D, and $230,000 from the money she
keeps). In each case, this is better than the donor’s utility without a subsidy, which is only $420,000
($120,000 from giving to A, and another $300,000 from the money she keeps). Yet donor utility would
increase even more with a subsidy that replaces gifts she would make anyway – such as the gift to A – so
she can keep (and consume) more money for herself. Thus, if the gift to A is subsidized, so that she
contributes only $70,000, then her utility is $450,00 ($120,000 from the gift to A, and $330,000 from the
money she keeps). Yet although this scenario offers higher utility to the donor, it obviously offers lower
utility to potential beneficiaries.
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giving from $99,999 to $100,000 (and thus to forgo the first dollar of her own
consumption).37
If we want a standard schedule for everyone, it seems a reasonably safe bet that,
for most donors, it is probably unnecessary to subsidize the first dollar of charity, and the
system would induce more contributions by redirecting these resources to offer more
generous matches of larger gifts, which are more likely to be at the margin. In this spirit,
it is probably better for the government’s match to increase as the donor contributes a
larger percentage of income to charity – instead of having the match remain constant, or
even decrease.38
Current law does this, to a rough extent, by requiring taxpayers to itemize in order
to claim a charitable deduction, so that the first few dollars are not deductible. But this is
quite an imperfect way of pursuing this goal, if only because taxpayers who have enough
mortgage interest or state and local income taxes to justify itemizing can deduct the first
dollar contributed to charity.
In any event, an important feature of our system is thoroughly inconsistent with
this principle: taxpayers who contribute too high a percentage of their income cannot

37

Although the analysis in text does not consider charity to be part of a donor’s consumption, there
obviously is a consumption element to charity, which is inherent in the “double utility” concept. If we
think donors have diminishing marginal utility in giving to charity, as is typically the case with any
consumption item, then the argument in text holds: giving the first dollar generally is more appealing (and
less in need of a subsidy) than giving the last. Of course, one complication here is that there may be added
consumption value to a giving a very large gift – including naming opportunities, being honored at
charitable dinners and the like – which are not available through smaller gifts. Yet these nontax
inducements to make larger gifts are consistent with the idea of diminishing marginal utility in giving; they
are thought to be necessary because otherwise donors would give less.
38
Saul Levmore also suggests a subsidy that increases as taxpayers give more than a minimum percentage
of their income. But his rationale is different. Levmore’s goal is not to increase the volume of
contributions, but to be more equitable. People who give a larger percentage of their income, he argues, are
doing more than their share – they are giving more than they would have had to give if the funds were
raised through taxes, instead of through charity – so they should be rewarded for doing so. Levmore, supra
note 7, at 416 (“If . . . any earner gives more than his progressively required share, then it might be fair to
give a greater reward.”).
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deduct these excess contributions (generally, contributions exceeding either 30% or 50%
of their adjusted gross income, depending on the context).39 If we want the tax system to
induce more contributions, it is counterproductive to revoke the government match from
taxpayers as their giving rises above this level. Since it is more daunting to give away
60% of your income than 10%, it is perverse to have a less generous match for the
former.
Yet in contemplating a revision of this rule, we run up against a competing value
– ensuring that each taxpayer is involved, at least to an extent, in funding public goals
that are collectively determined. To be clear, the rule is not necessary to ensure that they
are supporting public goals, since nonprofits also pursue public goals. Although I am
inclined to give priority to incentivizing contributions, reasonable minds can disagree
here, and the fault line likely will be whether we trust wealthy individuals (the only
people who can realistically give away all their income) to support the right causes, a
point that is discussed in detail in Part III.
There is another way in which current law has it backwards: Instead of offering a
more generous match as the level of contributions rise, a deduction (as opposed to a
credit) becomes less valuable as giving increases, as long as the rate structure is
progressive. The reason is that, if the taxpayer gives away enough of her income, she
shifts to a lower tax bracket, reducing the value of additional contributions beyond that
point (since the tax that the deduction helps her avoid is lower).40 The practical impact of
39

See Section 170(b)(1). Unless otherwise indicated, the phrase “section” refers to a section of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 (I.R.C.), as amended and codified in 26 U.S.C. (2000).
40
For example, assume that there are four tax rates: 0% on income up to $50,000; 20% on income from
$50,000 to $200,000; 25% on income from $200,000 to $300,000; and 33% on all income above $300,000.
For a taxpayer earning $400,000, the government offers a 1-for-2 match on the first $100,000 of
contributions: The taxpayer avoids a 33% tax, so $66,666 of the first $100,000 comes from the taxpayer,
while $33,333 comes from the government. But if the taxpayer gives away $200,000, then the

21

this point should not be overstated, though, since the donors who give very large gifts
tend to have incomes so deep in the top bracket that, to them, the rate structure feels
flat.41
A further problem with using a deduction (as opposed to a credit) is that the
government’s match is tied inextricably to the tax rate. The connection, obviously, is that
the government’s matching contribution (in the form of tax forgiven) depends on the tax
rate. This obviously means the charitable deduction is more valuable to high-income
taxpayers than to low-income taxpayers (who are subject to a lower tax rate), which
reinforces the concern that the deduction disproportionately benefits wealthy taxpayers.42
A further problem is that the tax rate is not, and cannot be, set to induce the maximum
level of contributions. Rather, in setting tax rates, policy makers are focused on different
elasticities: the willingness of taxpayers to work and save, not their willingness to give to
charity. It seems unlikely that these various elasticities are so closely related that a tax
rate tailored for work and savings will also yield an optimal result for charitable giving.
Our system would be more effective at encouraging generosity, then, if we stop using a
deduction, and instead use a tax credit calibrated to giving elasticity, so that the credit’s
value generally increases with the percentage of income that the taxpayer is contributing.
Yet although it makes sense for the subsidy to increase in this way, this general
principle does not tell us the answer to specific questions. Where exactly should the
subsidy begin? At what point should it increase? By how much? The problem with a

government’s match on the second $100,000 gift is only 1-for-three. Because the tax rate has declined to
25%, $75,000 comes from the taxpayer, while $25,000 comes from the government. Since it is more
difficult for the taxpayer to give the larger gift, it is unhelpful for the government’s match to decline in this
way.
41
Indeed, given the limit on deducting more than 30% or 50% of adjusted gross income, described above,
they typically cannot give enough away to get their incomes into a lower bracket.
42
See infra Part III.B.3 for a discussion of this distributional concern.
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uniform schedule, obviously, is that a point that is marginal for some will be too low for
some and too high for others. As a result, a uniform schedule will inevitably commit
some of the subsidy to infra-marginal contributions of very generous donors, and may
also be too high to induce marginal contributions from less generous donors.43
Although a uniform schedule can’t create perfect incentives, it can still be
improved. The challenge is a bit like the one for setting tax rates, which also must
account for an unobservable characteristic, earning ability, which, like generosity, varies
among taxpayers and which they have incentive to conceal. We should prefer a subsidy
schedule that, all else being equal, creates the right incentives often enough to induce the
maximum of additional contributions.
In that spirit, since the average U.S. household with an income above $100,000
gives 3% of their income to charity, the government may not need to match smaller gifts
(e.g., less than 1.5% of household income).44 Instead, the government could use the
savings from such a floor to sweeten the match for larger gifts (e.g., in excess of 1.5%) in
a revenue neutral way.45 Or we could have a multi-tiered scale, such as a four-tiered
credit in which (1) gifts totaling 1% or less of income receive no credit; (2) gifts totaling
between 1% and 3% get a 10% credit; (3) gifts between 3% and 10% get a 30% credit;
43

The literature generally assumes that it is unfortunate to subsidize inframarginal contributions. Indeed,
the theoretical literature on the neutrality theorem and the empirical literature on whether a subsidy
generates additional contributions have as their (at times unstated) premise the idea that this outcome is to
be avoided. Yet it is worth observing that, as long as the cause is a socially useful one, such that positive
externalities are being generated, the money is not wasted. The main reason not to crowd out private
contributions, then, is if they are raised at lower social cost than taxes. I tend to think they are, but the
answer to this empirical question obviously depends on the context. I am grateful to Louis Kaplow for this
observation.
44
See President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform (Nov. 1, 2005) (proposing 1% floor).
45
For example, if a taxpayer has income of $1 million, every dollar of contribution in excess of 1.5% of a
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income ($15,000 for this taxpayer) could generate a credit of, say, 40 cents on her
tax. If this taxpayer gave $15,000, then, she would not receive any tax credit. But if she gave $100,000,
she would receive a $34,000 credit (i.e., 40% of $85,000, which is the excess of $100,000 over the
noncreditable $15,000). This should create a stronger incentive to give than, say, a 34 cent credit for every
dollar given to charity (including the first dollar).
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and (4) gifts over 10% get a 40% credit. There is a tradeoff here, in which more nuanced
incentives can be created at the cost of more complexity.
Such a system is complicated not only in requiring multiple tiers, but also in
requiring other refinements. For instance, a system with tiers would inadvertently
encourage taxpayers to concentrate into a single year gifts that they otherwise would have
given over multiple years. If no credit is given for gifts under 1.5% of adjusted gross
income, then a donor who otherwise gives 1.5% per year would likely give 4.5% in one
year, and then nothing in the next two. To avoid creating this sort of perverse incentive,
this regime would require a mechanism for averaging contributions and income across
years (e.g., a trailing three-year average).
4. Individually Customized Schedule
Even with these necessary refinements, a uniform schedule still is easier to
administer than one that is individually tailored. But would a customized schedule be
more effective at inducing marginal contributions? To tailor the structure to an
individual, we need information about her generosity. The best information we have is
what she has given in the past. For instance, the system can look to a donor’s average
giving over the past five years, setting a floor so that no subsidy is awarded for any
giving below some fraction of this average giving (e.g., one-third). Likewise, an extra
benefit can be offered for contributions above this prior giving level.
For example, assume that two taxpayers, A and B, have the same earnings -$100,000 per year – but A is more generous than B. A has given an average of 6% per
year over the past five years, while B has given 3%. Under this approach, then, A will
receive no subsidy for contributions below 2%, whereas the floor for less-generous B is
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only 1%. Likewise, the extra generous subsidy for A applies to giving above 6%, and for
B it applies for giving above 3%. The incentives here may be better than a one-size-fitsall subsidy with a floor of, say, 4%, which would subsidize inframarginal contributions
from A, and at the same time would be out of range for B.
Yet this individualized approach is more complicated, and it also may
inadvertently induce donors to backload their giving. For example, instead of giving 3%
per year for six years, B can give nothing for five years, and then can make a gift of the
same present value in the sixth year. In this way, B deducts the entire amount, since her
average giving over the preceding five years (and thus her threshold) will be zero. Put
another way, every dollar the donor gives in the current year has two effects: it attracts a
subsidy in the current year, but reduces the amount of the subsidy in future years. This
structure may also yield perverse effects during times of inflation, since increased
nominal giving will not necessarily represent increased actual giving. Likewise, in a
cyclical economy, donors who have given generously during a boom will, unfortunately,
have less incentive to maintain their giving during a subsequent downturn, since their
prior generosity will serve to reduce their current subsidy. More nuanced rules may
temper these problems but probably won’t eliminate them, and this reality undercuts the
benefit of an individualized schedule. Indeed, a similar approach is used with the
research and development credit, and has prompted similar concerns.46
5. Elasticity versus Externalities
Finally, it is worth emphasizing a potential tension between encouraging
generosity, on one hand, and focusing on projects that generate the most positive

46

See Robert Eisner et al, The New Incremental Tax Credit for R&D: Incentive or Disincentive?, 37 Nat.
Tax J. 171 (1984).
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externalities, on the other. For instance, assume that Donor A has an inelastic preference
to support a project that generates a high level of positive externalities, and Donor B has
an elastic commitment to support a lower value project. Should the subsidy focus on A’s
project (because of its higher value) or on B’s (because of B’s more elastic giving)? Of
course, if we had perfect information, we could address both goals at the same time – for
instance, by beginning the subsidy of B at a lower contribution level (to address B’s
elastic giving) while capping the subsidy dedicated to B’s project (to account for its lower
social value). Yet in a world of imperfect information, this subtle solution is difficult to
pursue. Even so, in designing a subsidy for charitable contributions, we need to consider
not only the need to encourage generosity, but also the need to allocate funds to high
value projects. We turn now to a discussion of the latter goal.

III.

Reflecting Preferences

Another information problem in the pursuit of public goals is the difficulty of
knowing which programs would do the most good if supported. How should scarce
public resources be divided among competing priorities? Do the parties making these
choices have the right incentives? In subsidizing charitable contributions, we delegate
significant influence over this decision to individual donors, who allocate not just their
own contribution but the matching government subsidy as well.
This is a significant delegation of authority – not at all typical in other
government programs – and it presents two tradeoffs, one relating to the quality of
decisionmaking and the other to its legitimacy. First, decentralized decisionmaking can
prompt experimentation and competition, but suffers from a lack of coordination and
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scale (the “coordination tradeoff”). Second, subsidized charity allows some public
money to be allocated outside the political process, thereby empowering minorities to
pursue their preferences but, at the same time, concentrating disproportionate influence
among wealthy donors (the “representation tradeoff”).
Institutional design can temper these tradeoffs, and various options are
highlighted here. To a degree, though, policy judgments will also turn on instincts about
whether government or nonprofits are more deserving of our trust (or, perhaps, less
deserving of our distrust).
A. The Coordination Tradeoff
Through charitable contributions, individual donors make independent decisions
about which public goals to support. In this decentralized process, the information and
incentive advantages of flexibility and competition come hand-in-hand with the
disadvantages of insufficient coordination. In a sense, the tradeoffs here resemble those
of relying on state or local government instead of the federal government – except that
here, of course, no government is making any substantive decisions, so that charity is
even more flexible and local than state and local governments.
1. Flexibility
The decentralized charitable process offers familiar advantages of competition,
flexibility, and experimentation.47 Let’s say, for example, that we are committed to
providing food to the homeless. To secure government assistance for this objective –
even at the more flexible state or local level – we need to persuade a potentially large set
of key government decisionmakers. We might need to approach key legislators, who

47

See, e.g., Vickrey, supra note 24, at 36 (noting that charities enjoy “greater freedom of action” than
government).

27

could then help persuade a majority of their colleagues, either through the force of
argument, vote trading, party loyalty, or other institutional mechanisms. We also need
support in the executive branch. In any political process, the preferences of the median
voter loom large, as Burton Weisbrod has emphasized. Bureaucratic constraints are also
significant, since any program will have to comply with a host of civil service rules,
standard procedures, and the like. Sometimes bureaucratic incentives are complicated,
focusing as much on turf protection or work minimization as on the public interest.
In contrast, pursuing this goal through a nonprofit can be very different. If we
have resources and time of our own to contribute, we can simply buy food and hand it
out. We don’t need anyone’s approval. Of course, our effort will be more substantial if
we can recruit others to our cause and, in doing so, we encounter some administrative
complexity.48 But we still need to persuade only the group of people who are helping us.
As this example suggests, the decentralization of this allocation process can allow
nonprofits to be more nimble than the government. In response to a crisis, they can be
formed quickly and then shut down once the need passes – all without clearing
bureaucratic hurdles that are common in government.
Relatedly, nonprofits are freer to engage in experimentation, and to compete with
each other. Even if there is a conventional wisdom about how to pursue a public goal, it
is relatively straightforward for dissenters to form a new organization with a novel
approach. If they can attract volunteers to provide time and resources, they are off and
running. In the government, the process obviously would be quite different, requiring the
requisite approvals within a hierarchy. Not surprisingly, then, a number of important

48

For example, we probably will want to form a nonprofit corporation and provide tax-related
documentation to donors who make contributions.

28

social movements – from civil rights and women’s rights to environmentalism – were
pursued first through nonprofits (e.g., the NAACP, the ACLU Women’s Rights Project,
the NRDC) before they ultimately became the subject of government action.49
Like state and local governments (but more so), nonprofits can rely heavily on
local preferences and information. This point is really another manifestation of the lack
of hierarchy within the nonprofit world. A new program does not have to be cleared in
Washington, the state capital, or city hall. If a community has a unique need, members of
the community can organize to address it, without having to make a case to people above
them in a hierarchy who may have less intimate knowledge of facts on the ground.
2. Lack of Filters or Coordination
Yet although a decentralized process can unleash creativity, it can unleash less
desirable qualities as well. Without hierarchies, nonprofits don’t necessarily have the
same filters that governments have to screen out bad ideas. For example, a government
manager who wants to build a “public” playground immediately opposite her home
presumably needs to justify this decision to senior officials within the hierarchy, whereas
there may be fewer constraints on a nonprofit manager or donor to behave selfinterestedly. Likewise, in government a foolish use of public resources – such as the
ketchup museum discussed above – would require the approval of various levels of
bureaucracy, who (hopefully) would reject the idea. In contrast, a wealthy donor could
simply create her own nonprofit and contribute money, thereby directing tax money to
the project (i.e., through the charitable deduction) without anyone else’s approval.
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Even when donors and managers behave generously and sensibly, the lack of
coordination can undercut the quality of their allocation decisions. As Saul Levmore has
emphasized, donors are forced to make decisions about what to support without full
knowledge of what other donors are doing.50 After September 11, for example, donors
gave so generously to help victims and their families that these charities were
overfunded. If donors had known how much others were giving, they probably would
have directed some donations elsewhere. Yet this problem should not be overstated.
Whereas donors may not know how much the charity will receive this year, they can
easily find out about last year. This provides the necessary guidance as long as giving
patterns are relatively stable and, except in extraordinary cases like September 11, they
tend to be.
Finally, a decentralized allocation process is also ill-suited to policymaking that
requires coordination. Obviously, some public goals involve network effects or
economies of scale, so that the quality of the program is enhanced by standardization and
size. Regulating natural monopolies has this quality, as does the military, in the sense
that a chain of command is necessary, and would be harder to attain if we relied on a
series of independent militia units that were nonprofits.
B. Representation Tradeoff
A charitable subsidy’s reliance on individual instead of collective decisionmaking
has implications not only for the quality of decisionmaking, but also for its legitimacy.
1. Minority Preferences
In a society in which tastes in public goods are heterogeneous, minority
preferences may be underrepresented in the political process. As Burton Weisbrod has
50
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emphasized, nonprofits allow these political outliers to organize and pursue goals that the
general political process may not favor. Ensuring that the funding for public goals is not
a “winner take all” competition – such that minority preferences also are reflected –
enhances the legitimacy of both the process for allocating funding and the outcome.
Minority preferences are registered not by political compromise or a mechanism
that binds the decisions of elected officials, but by circumventing elected officials
entirely. Donors vote directly with their contributions, Saul Levmore has observed, using
“taxes as ballots.”51 Levmore argues that this mechanism is more likely to reflect popular
preferences than governments burdened by public choice problems.
Obviously, one’s reaction to this idea is likely to depend, to a significant degree,
on one’s view of government. If we believe that elected officials have unique legitimacy
as decisionmakers and that public goals need to be pursued communally, then we are
likely to worry that donors, in allocating public resources, are usurping an authority more
properly exercised by government. In contrast, if we are skeptical about the
government’s inclination and ability to reflect popular will, as opposed to the agendas of
interest groups and professional politicians, then we are more likely to favor a robust role
for donors as a useful and legitimate complement to the government’s efforts. Like
Levmore, I am inclined to take the latter view, but reasonable minds can disagree on this
point.
2. Separation of Church and State
In any event, even those who believe that government decisions are uniquely
legitimate are likely to feel differently about funding religious organizations. If public
money is to go to religious groups, there are clear advantages in leaving the allocation of
51
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funds to individuals. Obviously, it is unconstitutional in the United States for
government officials to make decisions about which religion to support, and it makes
good sense, for a range of reasons beyond the scope of this Article, to reserve this sphere
of life to organizations that are purely voluntary, and that can compete freely with each
other for members without invoking the force of law.

3. Disproportionate Representation of Wealthy Donors
Although letting donors allocate public money has process-related advantages, as
discussed above, there are two problems with doing so. The first is that donors may not
adequately represent the preferences of society as a whole, so that there is allocation error
when the wrong projects are pursued. Yet this concern should not be overstated.
Obviously, there is no issue when donors pursue projects that nondonors also support.
There also is no problem when donors neglect projects that nondonors would support,
since the government is free to pick up the slack. Allocation error arises, then, only if
donors overinvest in idiosyncratic projects of little social value. This can happen, but it is
a relatively focused concern.
Even if the right projects are funded, there is a further problem that wealthy
people have a louder voice in the process.52 Wealthy donors have more money to give,
and thus can disproportionately influence the allocation of public money (i.e., the tax
subsidy). To my mind, this is the most powerful critique of the charitable deduction.
To put it in context, though, it is worth remembering that wealthy people already
exercise disproportionate influence over the market economy, as well as over other
government decisions, given the importance of campaign contributions to elected
52
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officials. Whether government funds are allocated actively by government officials or
passively by government matches, wealthy people are likely to exert disproportionate
influence either way. Indeed, if we are interested in reducing the influence exerted by
wealthy people, we should start with their role in government decisionmaking, since that
context does not offer voluntary redistribution and other welfare benefits to low income
people that are inherent in subsidized charity.
In any event, although it is reasonable to have reservations about allowing
wealthy people to allocate public funds in this way, this is a price we must pay in order to
secure the advantages of subsidized charity, which are substantial. Giving donors control
over what they support is a necessary precondition for securing voluntary redistribution
and a socially cheap source of funding for other public goals, and also for creating a set
of flexible institutions that compete and experiment. As with any tradeoff, though, the
question is not a binary one. Through nuances of institutional design, we can offer
donors some types of control, while withholding others.
C. Institutional Design: Constraints on Donor Choice
If the subsidy’s goal is to reflect preferences, it should be designed somewhat
differently than if the objective is to encourage generosity or to recruit private monitors.
Once again, three issues are discussed: the degree of control donors should have over the
causes they support; the distribution of the subsidy across income classes; and the
structure of the subsidy.
Whereas current law leaves individual donors with substantial control over what
causes they (and government matching funds) will support, this individual control has
costs as well as benefits, as noted above. This Section explores four different ways to
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constrain individual control. The first three do not involve any active decisionmaking by
government officials, but make the requirements for claiming the subsidy more specific
and rigorous: they relate to the characteristics of charities that are supported (“structuring
limits”); the subject matter (“substantive limits”); and the freedom of wealthy people to
participate (“eligibility limits”). The fourth involves the government in reviewing
specific proposals. After discussing this range of options, this Section briefly considers
two salient questions in the academic literature: whether a system of matching grants
should replace the deduction, and whether a subsidy should be available to for-profit
charity.
1. Structuring Limits
Without limiting the types of causes that donors can support or the freedom of
wealthy people to make subsidized contributions, the government can specify criteria that
individual organizations must meet (having nothing to do with which cause they support).
This sort of structuring requirement already exists under current law: for example, the
organization must be organized as a nonprofit – an issue to which we return below – and
contributions must be for the public good, not for the private benefit of donors, as noted
above.
The virtue of structuring requirements is that, if they are crafted wisely, they can
enhance the quality of individual decisionmaking without significantly limiting
individual control over subject matter; as a result, they should not diminish a donor’s
utility in giving (so that a tradeoff with the goal of encouraging generosity is avoided)
and these structuring requirements also should not impede the process of experimentation
and competition. Yet for the same reason – because they don’t reclaim substantive
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decisonmaking from individual donors to any significant degree – structuring
requirements don’t respond as directly to legitimacy concerns about wealthy donors
exerting disproportionate control, although they can offer some help on that dimension as
well.
In this spirit, current law can be changed to make greater use of participation
requirements, so that an individual donor can claim a deduction only if a minimum
number of other donors are also contributing to the cause (even in very small amounts).53
Participation requirements mitigate the coordination tradeoff by introducing a useful
filter, making it more difficult for an idiosyncratic or self-interested donor to pursue an
unwise idea with public money. To build a ketchup museum, for instance, a donor who
is willing to put up substantial funds can claim a tax deduction only if some number of
other donors are also willing to contribute. For the same reason, participation
requirements mitigate the representation tradeoff as well, ensuring that wealthy donors
are acting for others as well as for themselves.
At the same time, participation requirements do not limit in any way the subject
matter that the donor is pursuing, so that donors should still derive full utility from
giving. Indeed, they may feel all the better knowing that others share their goal. Donors
should remain (largely) free to experiment, as long as they can attract the requisite
number of people to join in the effort. It is worth observing, though, that poorly crafted
participation requirements could be subject to abuse, for instance, when small donors are
in effect bribed to contribute to a cause that a large donor wishes to support.
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A second structuring innovation involves information. In general, public charities
already fill out Form 990, and these are now available online. In addition, the
government can require more information, and can compile it in ways that enhance
individual decisionmaking. For example, Saul Levmore worries that charitable donors do
not know enough about what other donors are doing when making their own allocation
decisions, as noted above. In response, the government can publish an annual “charity
budget,” cataloging how charitable funds are allocated among different causes. What
percentage has been devoted to education, the environment, poverty relief, and religious
organizations? The government can propose classifications and ask charities to code
themselves on Form 990. As with participation requirements, this structuring
requirement does not seek to favor one type of cause over another, but to help individuals
make better decisions.
In addition, this information is valuable to the government, since government
budgets should adjust to offset under- and over-funding within the charitable sector. For
example, if the opera is already well taken care of, the National Endowment for the Arts
should reallocate funding elsewhere.
2. Substantive Limits
In a more assertive intervention, the government can express a preference for
some public goals over others. To a limited extent, substantive limits already exist under
current law. First, the list of charitable purposes in 501(c)(3) is broad, but not unlimited.
Not everything qualifies as, “charitable, religious, educational, scientific, literary . . .
fostering national or international amateur sports competition, and the preventing of
cruelty to children or animals.” For instance, enhancing national defense does not
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qualify, and rightly so, since national defense is not an appropriate subject for individual
policymaking, as noted above.54 Second, the government already can disallow the
charitable deduction for reasons of public policy. Thus, the deduction is not available for
contributions to charities that finance terrorism or to colleges that ban interracial dating.55
The government is free to make greater use of this power by offering a broader list of
disallowed causes.
As an even stricter substantive limit, the government can offer extra-generous tax
benefits to causes that it deems a particularly high community priority. The government
can offer different tiers of tax benefits, and periodically can prioritize among different
types of causes. In one year, Congress can favor poverty relief and, in another,
environmental protection; thus, donations to any charities with these missions can
become eligible for especially generous tax benefits, while other charities remain in the
standard program.
Since different charities generate different externalities, the subsidy for different
activities should vary, at least in principle.56 A systematic effort in this regard can reduce
the risk of allocation error and can also enhance legitimacy by constraining the discretion
of wealthy donors. For example, we may think that private donors overspend on opera,
museums, and other cultural institutions, while underspending on the homeless and the
developing world; tax benefits can be scaled back for the former and ramped up for the
54
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latter.57 Meanwhile, individuals are still allowed to exercise discretion within the
(narrowed) parameters, such that experimentation and competition can still continue,
albeit to a lesser degree.
Yet there are reasons not to increase government control in this way. Obviously,
there is a tension with the goal of maximizing generosity. Some would-be-donors to
disfavored categories may give as much overall as they otherwise would have, while
simply redirecting their giving to favored categories. But others may simply reduce their
overall level of giving.
A further cost of this approach is that the system becomes more complicated. If
different types of nonprofits are supported in different degrees, charities will have to
classify themselves. Assuming poverty relief is favored, does a law school qualify by
offering financial aid for low-income students and clinical programs for indigent clients?
May a portion of the law school’s overhead be allocated to these causes and, if so, what
percentage? If not, does the result change if the law school creates a separate nonprofit to
house these programs, and charges it for the use of law school facilities? From the
donor’s perspective, the preparation of a return can be complex enough, without
cluttering it further with different tax benefits for different charities.
In addition, once the government declares itself in the business of differentiating
among charities, the incentive of nonprofit managers to invest time and resources in
lobbying the government will increase substantially.58 Nepotism and corruption will rear
their ugly heads, as the lobby for universities competes with the lobby for museums to
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hire a key senator’s daughter. Nonprofit managers will also be further detached from
their primary mission of running nonprofits, as the burdens of lobbying are added to the
burdens of capital campaigns. To my mind, the added government input is not worth
these costs, although reasonable minds can disagree on the point.
3. Eligibility Limits
Another response to the disproportionate influence of wealthy donors is to limit
what they can contribute. This approach, which conflicts with the goal of encouraging
generosity, is discussed further below under distribution.
4. Project-by-Project Review
In the three prior categories, the government ratchets up the rigor and detail of the
eligibility requirements for making subsidized contributions, but does not pass on the
wisdom of specific contributions. In theory, though, the government can claim the right
to sign off on particular gifts. For example, Congress or a particular committee can be
required to approve tax benefits above a particular size. After all, in deducting a billion
dollar charitable contribution, a taxpayer reroutes a very substantial amount of tax
revenue, and a case can be made for government input in this decision. More generally,
the government can function like a private foundation, accepting applications in which
donors ask the government to match their contributions.
This step lends greater coordination to charitable giving and diminishes the
influence of wealthy donors, but at significant (and to my mind excessive) cost. To
process the relevant information and make particularized judgments, the government will
need a sizable infrastructure. Yet although the cost of government decisionmaking
increases dramatically, quality and legitimacy do not necessarily improve. In substituting
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their own judgments for those of private parties, government decisionmakers forgo some
of the benefits of experimentation and competition, noted above. This more active
approach will not represent minority perspectives as readily, and will also spawn
lobbying, and the nepotism and corruption that sometimes accompany it. It may also
reduce the overall level of private giving in curtailing the choices open to private donors.
5. Tax System Versus Expenditure System
So far, this Subsection has considered various changes in the way the charitable
subsidy is allocated. Another alternative, which has received attention in the literature, is
to remove the function entirely from the tax system. Since Stanley Surrey, many tax
academics have urged the tax system to focus only on raising tax revenue. In this spirit,
Paul McDaniel suggests replacing the charitable deduction with a system of matching
grants housed outside the tax system.59
Although at first blush this seems like a radical change, there is less at stake here
than first meets the eye. Either alternative can be structured in a range of ways, and there
is considerable overlap in what they can achieve. For example, either a tax-based system
or a direct-expenditure system can specify substantive priorities or limit the eligibility of
wealthy taxpayers.
There are two main differences. First, the tax system is less able to conduct
project-by-project review, since its employees lack expertise to evaluate the substance of
donor proposals. If the government wants to pass on the merits of a proposal to support
education, the Department of Education is better positioned than the IRS to do so. Yet
although the best reason to adopt McDaniel’s proposal is for project-by-project review,
there are significant reasons to oppose active government screening, as noted above.
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Second, using an expenditure system may increase overall administrative costs.
This is obviously the case if project-by-project review is adopted. But even if the
government’s role is more modest – so that current law is replicated, but moved out of
the tax system – the cost savings in the tax system may be more than offset by the cost of
creating a new bureaucracy.60 For instance, there are synergies in administering the
subsidy through the tax system, since information it collects (e.g., a donor’s level of
income) is likely to be relevant.
6. For-Profit Charity
In discussing constraints on donor choice, it is worth considering one more
intriguing proposal in the academic literature. Anup Malani and Eric Posner argue that
the subsidy should not be limited to nonprofits, but should be available to for-profits as
well.61 They argue that for-profits offer better incentives for charitable managers to be
efficient, for instance, at minimizing costs. This is probably true, although a for-profit
manager might not have the same incentive to enhance the quality of charitable
endeavors, as Malani and Posner acknowledge.
Yet the main problem with Malani and Posner’s proposal is that it puts pressure
on the process for allocating the subsidy. Not-for-profit form is a useful, if imperfect,
proxy for charitable purpose. As Henry Hansmann has argued, nonprofit managers signal
their dedication to the cause by forgoing the opportunity to claim profits – the so-called
“nondistribution constraint.”62 Malani and Posner are right that, in principle, for-profit
60
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managers can also be committed to philanthropy, but how can we tell? Under current
law, the substantive scope of the charitable subsidy is quite broad – too broad to
distinguish for-profits with genuinely charitable purposes from those who wish to pad
their profits: The subsidy supports any efforts that are “charitable, religious, educational,
scientific, literary . . . fostering national or international amateur sports competition, and
the preventing of cruelty to children or animals.” Yet couldn’t any research and
development efforts of for-profit firms qualify as “scientific”? Perhaps advertising
expenses are “educational.” Maybe the work of securities markets is also “educational,”
since prices have important informational value. Newspapers would surely make a
similar claim, as would the publishing and maybe even the entertainment industry.
The answer here, obviously, is to tighten up the definition of which activities are
eligible. In other words, for-profits should also be subsidized, as Malani and Posner
suggest, but the subsidy cannot be an open-ended one, like the charitable subsidy under
current law. Instead, if the government specifies a goal – like building a particular fighter
plane or developing alternative fuels – a for-profit can be trusted to pursue this specified
goal and, as Posner and Malani observe, they have incentives to contain costs. In this
spirit, for-profit firms commonly receive government resources in other contexts. They
are hired as government contractors and also enjoy targeted tax benefits such as
accelerated depreciation, alternative energy tax credits, and the like.63
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Yet making the regime for charitable subsidies comparably specific– a necessary
step if for-profits are to be included – comes at a significant cost. As noted above, the
vague definition of current law has value in taking the government out of the allocation
process, and in promoting experimentation and competition. This way, causes we
haven’t yet imagined can find a start with a small group of donors. This is a cost that
Malani and Posner never discuss, but it strikes me as extremely important. As a result, it
is better to subsidize for-profits in other ways (as, obviously, is quite common), while
limiting the charitable subsidy – with its usefully vague scope – to nonprofits.
Even so, Malani and Posner are right that nonprofits have their own incentive
problems, including the risk of inefficient implementation. Part IV considers a range of
ways to address this issue.
D. Institutional Design: Distribution and Structure
If the goal is to reflect preferences, instead of to enhance generosity, then
directing the subsidy to wealthy donors becomes problematic, for the reasons noted
above. Their preferences may not be representative and, even if they are, there is a
process-related concern with giving them a greater say in the allocation of public money.
One strategy for addressing this concern, as noted above, is to limit the discretion
of wealthy donors in a range of ways. The idea is to keep subsidizing their charitable
contributions – and thus to keep encouraging their generosity – while at the same time
using the political process, and the rest of the population’s ability to be represented in it,
to constrain what charitable donors can do with public money.
Instead of relying on wealthy donors for contributions but reducing their
discretion, another option is to seek more contributions from low- and middle-income
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donors. In this spirit, these donors can receive a refundable credit or some other
especially generous subsidy. At the limit, we could even use a checkoff, in which
taxpayers can allocate money to a cause of their choice (by “checking off” a box on their
tax return) without contributing any money of their own.64 Yet if individuals don’t have
to invest any of their own funds, they may not give enough thought to the choice.
Instead, they should be required to invest some amount of “earnest money,” but less than
what wealthy people must put up.65
Correspondingly, the subsidy claimed by wealthy donors can be capped. The
limit can be either a dollar amount or, as under current law, a percentage of income. By
relying on caps or multiple subsidy schedules in this way, we can reduce the percentage
of the subsidy dedicated the wealthiest taxpayers.66 Yet the tradeoff, obviously, is that
the subsidy will be less successful at encouraging generosity.

IV.

Recruiting Private Monitors

A further problem of information and incentives that arises in the pursuit of public
goals – whether through government or through private actors – is the difficulty of
monitoring quality. In response, another purpose of subsidized charity is to recruit
private donors as monitors. Since they are contributing their own money, donors have
the incentive to assess whether their gifts are having a positive impact. When the donor
is capable of making a large contribution, moreover, she is likely to have influence with
64
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the nonprofit manager. By passively subsidizing such gifts, the government piggybacks
on the positive externalities associated with this monitoring – a point that, to my
knowledge, has not been made before in the academic literature on charitable subsidies.
A. Information and Incentive Problems in Governing Nonprofits
While the success of any enterprise needs to be monitored, nonprofits and
government face special problems. They cannot use profitability as a measure of success.
In addition, there can be a separation between those who benefit from nonprofit and
government programs and those who pay for them.
The classic academic response, first emphasized by Henry Hansmann, is that
nonprofit managers cannot receive a distribution of profits, and thus are shielded from the
temptation to cut corners on quality.67 Like nonprofits, the government also has a
nondistribution constraint.68 In both settings, the constraint is helpful, to be sure, but not
wholly effective. For example, it is well understood that the nondistribution constraint
cannot keep nonprofit managers from pampering themselves with inflated salaries, a
short working day, and the like. Nor does it ensure that managers display good judgment
or run a well functioning organization.
To an extent, the beneficiaries of nonprofit and government programs monitor
quality, but not always effectively. They need enough information about quality to be
able to make a judgment. Individual beneficiaries may not have access to such
information, or may not have the sophistication to evaluate it; they may be helped, to an
extent, by organizations that evaluate the performance of nonprofits, but the quality of
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these efforts varies as well.69 In addition, if the evaluation is negative, beneficiaries need
an alternative so they can vote with their feet. These conditions do not always hold. For
instance, exit may be difficult either because there aren’t any practically available
alternatives (e.g., only one religious school in the neighborhood) or because the
nonprofit’s endowment gives it an advantage that is hard to replicate (e.g., leaving the
church means losing the church building).
In addition to beneficiaries, senior managers in nonprofits and government can be
of some help. They typically have a personal commitment to the cause, as evidenced by
their willingness to work for below-market wages.70 Although some may be looking for
lighter hours and better quality of life, the lean staffing at nonprofits and government
tends to undercut this motivation, especially for senior people. Yet even idealists need to
be monitored, if only to ensure that they are not making mistakes or unwise judgments.
Also, idealists are not immune from self-interested behavior, especially if no one is
watching.
The government also monitors nonprofits to a degree through the state attorney
general and a range of other context-specific regimes. It is a familiar point that the state
attorney general’s oversight of the nonprofit sector generally is quite limited.71 The
extent of other regulation varies, sometimes dramatically, so that hospitals are subject to
stringent regulation, while religious institutions are essentially unregulated.
B. Tradeoffs in Donor Monitoring
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To fill in the gaps, donors can play a significant role in advising nonprofit
managers and monitoring performance. Since monitoring in a governmental setting
generally is quite different, donor monitoring is a distinctive feature of subsidized charity
that has not previously been recognized in the academic literature. There are two
tradeoffs associated with donor monitoring, one relating to the skill sets of donors and the
other to their incentives.
1. Skill-Set Tradeoff
An important advantage of donor monitoring is that donors can be the source of
rare expertise, helping to fill in gaps in the skill sets of nonprofit managers. The typical
nonprofit manager has deep knowledge about the nonprofit’s mission and an idealistic
commitment to it. But some nonprofit managers do not have equally deep experience in
crafting budgets, refining communications strategies, structuring departments, engaging
in strategic planning, handling complicated subordinates, conducting periodic reviews,
implementing governance systems, and the other nitty gritty that is second nature to
successful entrepreneurs and for-profit managers. Of course, some nonprofit managers
do have these skills, but for those who don’t, there is an obvious source of advice to be
tapped: these skills are common among significant donors.
This complementarity of skill sets creates the possibility for a highly synergistic
partnership between nonprofit managers and donors – one that can be replicated in every
sector of the nonprofit world. To this partnership, donors contribute business acumen,
advising the nonprofit manager on strategic questions, crisis management, and the day-today challenges of running an institution. Through these interactions, donors have ample
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opportunity to evaluate the performance of the nonprofit’s programs and senior
management.
Yet the tradeoff here is that donor expertise has limits, and it is important for
donors to respect these limits. A highly successful investment banker has much to add to
the operation of a hospital, but evaluating the quality of competing methods of treatment
is probably not her strong suit. Although an accomplished movie producer can help a
museum with branding and budgets, she may have less to say about which works of art
are worth acquiring. Donors need to recognize that some issues are beyond their
expertise and that some decisions need to be the responsibility of the nonprofit’s
professional staff (although the staff can be asked to explain their judgments). In my
experience, donors usually have a clear understanding of these boundaries, but it is too
optimistic to assume that donors always do. When donors seek to intervene beyond their
expertise, nonprofit managers are in the delicate position of having to establish
boundaries but, hopefully, without offending the donor and losing a potentially valuable
source of funding.72
This is a long way of saying that wise and sophisticated donors can add
considerable value, but that not all donors are wise and sophisticated. The challenge here
is to empower donors whose input is constructive, while constraining the influence of
those who are not.
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This analysis focuses on individual donors, as opposed to foundations. Foundation managers are
sometimes professionals whose skill set overlaps significantly with the nonprofit manager’s, such that they
have more detailed knowledge than individual donors about the cause. Given their connection to a range of
nonprofits, they are likely to have deep experience in advising and evaluating charitable programs. In some
cases, though, professional foundation managers have somewhat less business experience than individual
donors. Professional foundation managers also bring the potential for another incentive problem – the
possibility that the foundation manager is not pursuing the agenda set by the donor who created the
foundation. This agency cost problem obviously does not arise when donors make their own philanthropic
decisions. These important issues require more extensive treatment than can be offered in this Article.

48

2. Incentives Tradeoff
To monitor a nonprofit’s success, a donor must have not only the skills, but also
the incentive, to do so. An important precondition of the donor-manager partnership,
described above, is the donor’s willingness to invest time. Admittedly, some prefer to
write a check and then have nothing else to do with a group (for instance, because they
are contributing as a favor to a friend). Yet especially among those who make large
contributions, there is a strong incentive to ensure that money is well spent. After all,
there are many potential outlets for a substantial gift, and donors want to be sure they
choose the right one. They typically want access to the nonprofit’s leaders before making
the decision to provide financial support, and they usually want the relationship to
continue after their initial contribution. This is all the more true, of course, if a feature of
the nonprofit bears their name, such as a professorship or a concert hall. Then it becomes
“their” opera or school, in a very personal sense.
This interest of donors in giving time, as well as resources, is exemplified by a
new trend known as “venture philanthropy.” The quintessential venture philanthropist is
an investment manager whose “day job” involves critiquing business plans, evaluating
senior management and, more generally, making judgments about where to commit
capital in the for-profit sector. The idea behind “venture” philanthropy is to bring the
same approach to the nonprofit world. Venture philanthropists do not want to hear only
about how important a cause is; they want to hear what the nonprofit leader plans to do
about it. They want detailed plans, progress reports, documented results – and,
obviously, a seat at the table so they can be closely involved in the governance of the
nonprofit.
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In order for donors to play this monitoring role, it is not enough for the donor to
be willing; the manager must be willing as well. The donor cannot have a meaningful
role unless the manager shares information and, in some sense, authority as well. This
cuts against the all-too-human impulse to protect one’s turf, but managers should realize
that they stand to benefit by tapping the donor’s expertise. If this is not motivation
enough, they have another strong (and obvious) reason as well: the need to raise money
for their program.73 In my experience, the best way to raise money is to make potential
donors feel included. They appreciate time with nonprofit leaders – indeed, they will
insist on it – and they want to be heard. If the relationship grows to the point where
donors feel not only consulted, but in some sense responsible, then their financial
commitment will be reinforced immeasurably.
Obviously, nonprofit managers do not have the time to provide this sort of access
to every donor. The average donor who writes a small check will have little or no
influence on the governance of the nonprofit – and, knowing this, they are unlikely to
invest the time involved in seeking this role – just as small shareholders have only
modest influence over a for-profit firm.74 Managers still want their good will, since they
have influence in the aggregate (again, just as small shareholders do), but managers are
more likely to view this group as an audience for a communications strategy, rather than
as a governing body.
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Significant donors will be especially influential in organizations that depend most heavily on donor
financing, as opposed to fees charged to beneficiaries. But even if donations represent a relatively modest
percentage of the overall operating budget, they still get a manager’s attention; even a 5% cut in the budget
involves layoffs, program cuts, and other unpleasant choices that nonprofit managers will prefer to avoid.
74
Cf. Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and ForProfit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 457 (1996).
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The most meaningful monitoring is done by a small cohort of donors, who
provide the most significant financial support. Again, there is a clear analogy to forprofit firms, where large shareholders are best positioned to monitor management, and
the rest of the shareholders piggyback on their efforts. Whether they have formal
responsibilities within the organization, such as a seat on the board of directors, is not
critical. Being on the board gives them some formal legal authority, but the main source
of their leverage – the real reason they can gain access, influence policy, and, in some
cases, effect a change in the leadership – is their control of the purse strings. The
influence comes not so much from terms or conditions that the donor has imposed on past
gifts – although those, of course, can be important -- but from the possibility that a
donor will make another gift.75
In using this influence, donors are often motivated by idealistic impulses, as noted
above – after all, their financial support evidences a personal commitment to the cause –
but, in some cases, donor motivations will not be as pure. Self-dealing may be a concern.
For example, a donor might make a gift to a nonprofit and then suggest that, in return, the
nonprofit should purchase goods or services from her. Or the donor may want special
treatment from a nonprofit, such as unique access to health care from a hospital or
influence on admissions from an academic institution.
A subtler concern arises when a significant donor has a different substantive
vision for the charity than other donors.76 For example, assume that traditional donors to
an advocacy group favor a litigation-based approach, but a significant new donor uses her
influence to promote media-based strategies and community education. Or assume that
75

Cf. Triantis, supra note 71 (noting that donors have very limited formal power and that restrictions on
gifts are hard to enforce).
76
Triantis, supra note 71.
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traditional donors favor one substantive priority (e.g., land conservation) while the new
donor favors another (e.g., global warming). If the new donor uses her influence to effect
these changes, other donors may feel that their views are not adequately represented.
To sum up, then, a cohort of top donors can perform an important monitoring
function for nonprofits because these donors are likely to have both the access and
sophistication to evaluate whether goals are being implemented effectively, and the
influence to insist on changes, if any are necessary. There are tradeoffs here – including
the concern that donors will overstep their advisory role or behave self-interestedly – and
these are challenges for the nonprofit manager to finesse and, to an extent, for
institutional design as well.
3. An Advantage of Nonprofits Over Government
Before turning to institutional design, it is worth emphasizing that monitoring in
governmental settings generally is quite different. Legislators use hearings and studies to
advise and monitor government agencies, but government budgets are so large, and the
range of public goals is so vast, that legislators have only a passing knowledge of many
programs they fund. Organized interest groups and their lobbyists may perform a
monitoring role, but lobbyists are obviously much less likely than charitable donors to
focus on the public interest. As a practical matter, individual voters are even less
informed than legislators, and have only limited opportunities to vote “up or down”
about a given initiative.
Government programs also do not have the same access to expert advice.
Investment managers and entrepreneurs have rare skills, with a correspondingly high pay
scale that is well beyond what the government pays employees. It is sometimes possible
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to attract people with this level of expertise to serve in cabinet posts and in other senior
positions as political appointees. But given the size of the relevant government
bureaucracy, these senior officials will typically be farther removed from programmatic
details than their counterparts who advise nonprofits.
Of course, some government programs do have outside boards of advisors, such
as state hospitals or universities, or grant-awarding agencies such as NIH. These
sometimes offer expertise and monitoring benefits that are comparable to those found in
the nonprofit setting, although much depends on context-specific factors such as the
composition of the board and the degree of influence it can exert. In some cases it may
be advisable to expand this model within the public sector, although this issue is beyond
the scope of this Article. The main point here is that, unlike in government, the model
has quite broad application in the nonprofit sector, and this is a strength of subsidized
charity that has not attracted adequate attention.
C. Institutional Design: Control and Distribution
How is institutional design affected if the priority is recruiting private monitors,
instead of encouraging generosity or reflecting preferences? This Section and the next
consider our familiar criteria of control, distribution, and structure.
To recruit monitors, we should let taxpayers support what they personally find
most rewarding, so they are more likely to invest time as well as money. In this respect,
there is overlap with what we do to encourage generosity and tension with a structure
designed to reflect a broader range of preferences.
Even so, we might still want to constrain donor choice in two ways. The first is to
create incentives to concentrate giving. If a donor gives to fewer causes, she has more
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time to monitor each one, and will devote more thought in choosing which to support.
For example, if A and B each plan to give $2 million to charity, and there are two
potential donee organizations, it is probably better for A to give $2 million to one and B
to give $2 million to the other, instead of each making a gift of $1 million to each charity.
Either way, each charity gets the same gift and, admittedly, A and B may feel somewhat
less utility from their giving (i.e., if they otherwise would have divided their giving), but
the potential externalities from more careful monitoring favor concentrated giving.
A second constraint on choice has to do with the form of the gift, rather than the
object: It may be better for donors to give spendable money instead of endowments on
the theory that spendable gifts enhance the donor’s leverage. By making decisions one
year at a time, the donor makes an annual judgment about the quality of the nonprofit’s
efforts. With an endowment, in contrast, the donor has provided this cash flow in
advance, and the effect is essentially irrevocable. Although conditions can be placed on
how the endowment is used, it will be difficult for the donor to impose a condition
relating to the quality of the effort, since the condition is hard to specify, let alone to
enforce. As a practical matter, the nonprofit has to violate the condition quite blatantly in
order to be legally vulnerable.
While there are thus reasons for the charitable subsidy to be more generous in the
case of spendable money, there are also arguments that cut in the opposite direction. If
the goal here is to piggyback on private monitors, then we might think that these donors
send an especially strong signal – one that is particularly worthy of a government
coinvestment – when they give an endowment gift. If they are willing to surrender
control in this way, they must have particular confidence in the nonprofit’s management.
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Of course, endowments are valuable on other dimensions too,77 something that further
complicates the question of whether to favor spendable money.
In any event, in deciding how much control taxpayers should have to choose
which charity they support, we see a tension between recruiting monitors and reflecting
preferences. A similar tension arises in deciding how to distribute the subsidy. A
subsidy structured to recruit monitors will target high-income taxpayers, since only they
can give generously enough to influence nonprofit managers. While such a subsidy can
also encourage generosity, targeting wealthy donors is not optimal for reflecting
preferences, as noted above. Once again, institutional design varies with the goal being
pursued.
D. Institutional Design: Structure
To recruit private monitors, then, the subsidy should focus on high-income
donors, while encouraging concentrated giving and, perhaps, spendable gifts as well. Yet
whether or not we add these refinements, the essential precondition for recruiting private
monitors is, more fundamentally, to structure the subsidy as a match. This way,
government money is committed only if private individuals put up their own money.
Since individual donors have incentive to spend their own money with care, the
government can piggyback on these private judgments without conducting an
independent investigation. Obviously, the tax deduction under current law has this
essential quality, as do the other proposals explored in this Article.78
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Endowments facilitate long-range planning, and help to bridge timing differences so that the donor can
make a gift (e.g., for tax reasons) before the nonprofit spends the money. It is well known, for instance,
that nonprofit needs tend to become more acute during economic downturns, when donor capacity is likely
to decline. See Triantis, supra note 71..
78
Although the focus of this Article is the income tax, it is worth noting that the analysis here may apply to
the gift tax, but generally does not apply to the estate tax. Obviously, once the donor has passed away, she
cannot serve as an advisor and monitor. At best, she can “pre-monitor” by making a careful investigation
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Since all of these proposals involve donor monitoring, each one presents the
tradeoffs, discussed above, in relying on such monitoring. Before considering further
what refinements of institutional design can mitigate these tradeoffs, it is worth
emphasizing the vital role of nonprofit managers in this regard. They need to
(graciously) deflect advice that is not valuable – and, indeed, to decline gifts that do not
advance the nonprofit’s mission – while handling self-interested donors with integrity
and tact. Competition among nonprofits is helpful here, since nonprofits whose donors
offer constructive monitoring and input are likely to outperform their peers.
There may also be a role for the tax law, which can be refined to enhance
monitoring in three ways: first, by flagging issues on which donor monitoring is
particularly important; second, by rewarding especially active monitors; and third, by
requiring disclosure about who the most significant donors are to each charity, so that
other donors know who the relevant monitors are in evaluating a given charity.
1. Flagging Issues
First, the tax law can encourage donors to focus on issues that are of special
concern. For instance, charities should not devote excessive resources to overhead or
fundraising, since these expenses divert resources from the charity’s core mission. The
tax law can focus donor attention on this issue by denying the tax benefit, or a portion of
it, when charities devote too large a percentage of their budgets to these non-core
expenses. With this sort of rule, the tax law can motivate donors, who care about the tax
benefit, to pressure charities to be more efficient.

of the charity while she is alive. Donor monitoring might serve as a rationale, then, for the transfer tax
system to favor intervivos giving over bequests, a point that is underexplored in the literature on the
subject. In any event, a detailed exploration of the estate and gift tax is beyond this Article’s scope.
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This approach has its share of difficulties, though. It is hard to promulgate
standards that are appropriate for all charities – on the proper level of overhead and
fundraising, as well as on other issues. It is unlikely that “one size fits all” rules will be
sensible in every context, especially as conditions change over time. Charities will also
be motivated to recharacterize their activities in order to provide more generous tax
benefits. Fundraising expense will be reclassified as “educational expense,” and the like.
2. Rewarding Effective Monitors
An alternative strategy is to reward especially good monitors. This approach
seems more promising than focusing on particular issues, although it too increases
administrative costs. There are three different factors that the regime can consider to
identify especially active monitors.
First, how sophisticated is the donor? As noted above, venture capitalists,
entrepreneurs, investment bankers, and other professionals have valuable expertise they
can lend to a nonprofit. In theory, the tax law can condition the size of the subsidy on the
donor’s education or professional experience, rewarding those who are in a position to
provide sophisticated advice. Yet this is an imperfect way to measure what a donor has
to offer. For example, someone who focuses on philanthropy full-time may make a
greater nonmonetary contribution than someone whose professional obligations are allconsuming.
A second factor, which is more objective, is to focus on the size of the gift as a
way of measuring how much the donor will care about it, and how much influence the
gift will have with the nonprofit. In measuring how much the donor has at stake, the
system can measure the gift as a percentage both of the donor’s income and of her overall
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giving (with the latter inquiry obviously encouraging concentrated giving). After all, a
gift of $500,000 is less significant to someone giving away $10 million than to someone
giving away $600,000. In focusing on size, the system also has to measure what
percentage the gift represents of a nonprofit’s budget. A gift of $25,000 is large enough
to influence a charity with a $100,000 annual budget, but not a $100 million budget. In
this spirit, a gift that represents more than a minimum percentage of the taxpayer’s
income, the taxpayer’s giving, and also the annual charity’s fundraising can earn the
donor an extra “governance” subsidy.
Yet there obviously are complexities here, which may not be worth the effort. For
example, a charity might have the incentive to split itself into multiple charities, so that
each gift will seem like a more substantial percentage of its fundraising; in response,
rules will be needed to aggregate these numbers. Likewise, donors will face some
uncertainty about whether their gift is large enough, given uncertainties about a charity’s
fundraising in a given year, although this concern can be addressed by looking to the
prior year instead of the current year.
A third factor for measuring whether a donor is providing advice and monitoring
– and thus whether she should earn an extra governance-based tax benefit – is to ask
whether she has a formal governance role, such as membership on the board of directors.
A possible concern about this idea is that it is overinclusive, since it can lead to a
proliferation of advisory boards that do not have a real role, existing solely to justify this
tax benefit. To address this concern, the system will need a set of requirements that are
hard to fudge. For example, the tax benefit can be conditioned on attending a minimum
number of meetings, on having access to confidential information, and on having
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meaningful input on personnel issues, including the tenure of the nonprofit’s senior
managers. In addition, a limit is needed on the number of advisors that a nonprofit (and
related affiliates) can have.
A complicating dynamic here is that this rule empowers nonprofit managers to
give donors something of value – a ticket to a more generous tax benefit. We might
worry about making donors dependent on a nonprofit manager’s good will, since this
dependence may undercut a donor’s ability to discipline the nonprofit, thereby defeating
the purpose of the proposal. Given the important role that donors have in providing
funding, though, it is hard to picture them losing much of this leverage.
Perhaps a more telling objection to this proposal (and others like it) is that it is
unnecessary. The real source of influence that donors have is not formal authority, but
the power of the purse. The larger the gift, the more influence they have. It is not clear
that the government needs to provide an extra tax benefit to donors who have a formal
governance role, since a similar effect arises – at lower administrative cost – in a basic
matching program. As long as bigger gifts generally command bigger government
matches, something that is already true under current law, the government can rely on the
donors’ own incentives to watch how their money is used.
3. Disclosure About Most Significant Donors
Given the influence that significant donors can exert in advising and disciplining
nonprofits, we obviously want that influence to be used wisely. It stands to reason that
some donors are better monitors than others. It may be valuable, then, to create a means
to monitor the monitors. In this spirit, nonprofits can be required to offer more disclosure
about their most significant donors (with special rules for trusts, such that the trustee and
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the donor to the trust are both identified). If the donors have strong reputations – if they
are known to give good advice, not to seek preferential treatment, etc. – then the charity
will draw strength from its association with these donors. Just like some investors are
more inclined to invest in a firm once Warren Buffet has done so, some donors will
piggyback on the charitable judgments of well respected philanthropists. Likewise, if a
donor has a problematic reputation, then other donors will be more wary of the charity,
and will want to ask more questions about whether the donor is exerting undue influence.

V. Conclusion
This Article considers why we should pursue public goals with subsidized charity,
instead of with the many other policy instruments at our disposal, and offers three
separate reasons, all rooted in problems of information and incentives: first, to encourage
donors to be more generous; second, to measure and reflect popular preferences about
which public goals to pursue; and third, to recruit private monitors.
This Article uncovers a series of tradeoffs inherent in subsidizing charitable
contributions. Although funding that is given voluntarily comes at lower social cost,
there is rarely enough. A decentralized process for funding public goals allows for
competition and experimentation, but lacks coordination. It also empowers minorities,
but gives disproportionate influence to wealthy donors. These wealthy donors have the
influence and, in some cases, the expertise to be effective monitors, but who will monitor
them if they overstep their expertise or behave self-interestedly?
These tradeoffs can be resolved any number of ways, and the precise institutional
design we choose depends on our priorities. If our goal is to encourage generosity – and
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thus to increase the supply of voluntarily-provided (and, hence, low social cost) funding
for public goals – we should focus the subsidy on wealthy donors, who are most tax
sensitive. We should place only minimal limits on their ability to choose which causes to
support, and we should focus the subsidy on contributions that are marginal. Recruiting
these wealthy donors as monitors is largely compatible with this agenda. We should
create incentives for them to concentrate their giving and invest time.
Yet this agenda obviously will be less successful at reflecting popular preferences,
since the charitable priorities of wealthy people are not fully representative. How, then,
can we ensure that every else’s preferences are also satisfied? One possibility is to look
to government programs, instead of subsidized charity, to ensure representativeness. In
effect, we would look to subsidized charity to encourage generosity and to recruit private
monitoring, while leaving it to other policy instruments to advance goals that wealthy
donors are not interested in pursuing through philanthropy. This is the approach that I
would follow, but others can reasonably take a different view.
If subsidized charity must itself be more representative, the agenda described
above can be modified in ways small and large, depending on how willing we are to
sacrifice success at encouraging generosity and recruiting private monitors. Participation
requirements are a relatively modest adjustment. At the other end of the spectrum, we
can mine the preferences of low-income taxpayers with a check-off system (or an extragenerous match), while capping the subsidized contributions of wealthy donors and
constraining their ability to choose which causes to support. The balance we strike
depends, ultimately, on the values we seek to pursue. Yet even then, thoughtful
institutional design can help us negotiate these tradeoffs more effectively.
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